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This paper presents an equilibrium model of industry dynamics and capital structure de-
cisions. The unique stationary equilibrium is derived in closed-form. The analysis reveals
that the interaction between capital structure and production decisions inﬂuences the sta-
tionary distribution of surviving ﬁrms and their survival probabilities. Under reasonably
calibrated parameter values, the model predicts a low average industry leverage ratio which
is in line with that observed in practice. Comparative static analysis demonstrates that
the model can generate the relation between capital structure and ﬁrms’ entry, exit and
production decisions documented in the evidence. The model also provides a number of
new predictions regarding industry dynamics and capital structure.
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1.1 Motivation and Outline
The interaction between capital structure and product market decisions has recently re-
ceived considerable attention in both economics and ﬁnance. Beginning with Brander and
Lewis (1986, 1988) and Maksimovic (1988), a growing number of theoretical papers in-
vestigate this interaction. In addition, many empirical studies (Chevalier (1995a, 1995b),
Phillips (1995), Kovenock and Phillips (1997), Maksimovic and Phillips (1998), Zingales
(1998), Lang et al (1996), Mackay and Phillips (2001)) examine the relation between capi-
tal structure and ﬁrm entry, exit, investment and output decisions.1 These studies generally
document the following:
• Industry output is negatively associated with the average industry debt ratio.
• Plant closing is positively associated with debt and negatively associated with plant-
level productivity.
• Firm entry is positively associated with debt of incumbents.
• Investment is negatively associated with debt.
• There is substantial within- and across-industry variation in leverage.
It is well known that debt causes the underinvestment and asset substitution problems
identiﬁed by Myers (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, it is important to
emphasize that simply taking leverage as an exogenous regressor may be misleading. This
is because rational ﬁrms may anticipate the eﬀect of leverage on product/input market
behavior so that the latter may inﬂuence capital structure choices. This endogeneity has
been recognized; in particular, Zingales (1998, p. 905) points out that “in the absence of a
structural model we cannot determine whether it is the product market competition that
aﬀects capital structure choices or a ﬁrm’s capital structure that aﬀects its competitive
position and its survival”. This endogeneity problem makes the interpretation of the above
empirical evidence controversial.
The main contribution of my paper is to ﬁll this theoretical gap by providing an in-
dustry equilibrium model in which capital structure choices and production decisions are
simultaneously inﬂuenced by the same exogenous factors.
1Early studies that relate the cross-sectional behavior of leverage to industry characteristics include
Bradley et al (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988) among others.
1Another contribution of my paper is related to industrial organization. Many empir-
ical studies in industrial organization have documented cross-industry diﬀerences in ﬁrm
turnover. However, little theoretical research has been devoted to understanding the im-
pact of ﬁnancing policies on ﬁrm turnover.2 The second contribution of this paper is to show
how the interaction between ﬁnancing and production decisions inﬂuences ﬁrm turnover and
to provide new testable predictions regarding the determinants of ﬁrm turnover.
I now outline the basic structure of the model. The model features a continuum of ﬁrms
facing idiosyncratic technology shocks. These ﬁrms are controlled by shareholders and make
ﬁnancing, entry, exit and production decisions. T h ec a p i t a ls t r u c t u r ec h o i c ei sm o d e l l e db y
incorporating approaches of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), Kraus and Litzenberger
(1973), and Jensen and Meckling (1976).3 Moreover, this choice reﬂects the equilibrium
interaction between ﬁnancing and production/investment decisions. Speciﬁcally, produc-
tion/investment decisions are chosen to maximize equity value after debt is in place so that
shareholder-bondholder conﬂicts lead to agency costs as in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Myers (1977).4 The initial capital structure choice, made ex ante, trades oﬀ the tax advan-
tage of debt versus bankruptcy costs plus agency costs. Thus the model departs from the
standard Modigliani-Miller framework.
In a long-run stationary industry equilibrium, there is a stationary distribution of surviv-
ing ﬁrms. These ﬁrms exhibit a wide variation of leverage. Furthermore, all industry-wide
equilibrium variables are constant over time, although individual ﬁrms are continually ad-
justing, with some of them expanding, others contracting, some starting up, and others
closing down.
I derive a closed-form solution for the unique stationary equilibrium so that the model
can be analyzed tractably. I also study the eﬀects on the equilibrium of changes in growth
of technology, risks of technology, entry distribution, ﬁxed operating cost, entry cost,
bankruptcy cost, and corporate tax.
I now highlight the main mechanism operating in the model by an example. Consider
the eﬀect of an increase in technology growth and a risk neutral environment. First, this
increase has a cash ﬂow eﬀect in the sense that operating proﬁts are higher. It also has an
2See Caves (1998) for a survey of the empirical literature on ﬁrm turnover. See Jovanovic (1982), Hopen-
hayn (1992), and Ericson and Pakes (1995) for important theoretical models of industry dynamics. All these
papers assume that ﬁrms are all equity ﬁnanced.
3See Harris and Raviv (1991) for a survey of the theory of capital structure. They point out that ‘with
regard to further theoretical work, it appears that models relating to products and inputs are underexplored,
while the asymmetric information approach has reached the point of diminishing returns’ (pp. 299-300).
4Id on o tc o n s i d e rc o n ﬂicts between shareholders and managers. Morellec (2002) examines these conﬂicts
in a contingent claim framework.
2option eﬀect in the sense that it changes the expected appreciation in the value of the option
to default. These two eﬀects raise ﬁr mv a l u ea n dt h eb e n e ﬁt of remaining active. Thus,
the ﬁrm is less likely to default, and has lower expected bankruptcy costs. The standard
single ﬁrm tradeoﬀ theory then predicts that the ﬁrm should issue more debt. However, the
prediction that high-growth ﬁrms have high leverage is refuted by many empirical studies
(see Rajan and Zingales (1995), Barclay et al (2002), and references cited therein).
In the present industry equilibrium model, there is an important price feedback eﬀect
associated with an increase in technology growth. That is, potential entrants will anticipate
increased ﬁrm value and hence prefer to enter the industry. As a result, product market
competition causes the output price to fall. The decreased output price inﬂuences the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancing and liquidation/exit decisions. In particular, in contrast to standard single-ﬁrm
tradeoﬀ models, this feedback eﬀect may dominate so as to raise exit probabilities, lower
coupon payments, and lower the average industry leverage ratio.
The model also has important implications for industry dynamics. Speciﬁcally, an in-
crease in the rate of technology growth and the induced increase in exit probabilities have a
selection eﬀect in that the stationary distribution of surviving ﬁrms changes. This selection
eﬀect causes ineﬃcient ﬁrms to exit and be replaced by new entrants, leading to higher
industry output and a lower turnover rate.
Another important implication of the present model is that, in the presence of corporate
income taxes, debt ﬁnancing raises ﬁrm value, turnover rate, and industry output, compared
to Hopenhayn’s (1992) model without debt ﬁnancing.
1.2 Related Literature
There are three strands of related literature. One strand beginning with Black and Sc-
holes (1973) and Merton (1974) is in the framework of dynamic contingent claims analysis.
Brennan and Schwartz (1984), Mello and Parsons (1992), Mauer and Triantis (1994), and
Titman and Tsyplakov (2002) analyze the interaction between investment and ﬁnancing
decisions using numerical methods. Dixit (1989) studies entry and exit decisions under all
equity ﬁnancing. Leland (1994, 1998), Leland and Toft (1996), Goldstein et al. (2001),
and Morellec (2001) analyze corporate asset valuation and optimal capital structure using
analytical methods. All these models consider a single ﬁrm environment. Under perfect
competition, Leahy (1993) analyzes entry and exit under all equity ﬁnancing in an industry
equilibrium framework. Fries, Miller, and Perraudin (1997) generalize Leahy’s model and
study how entry and exit aﬀect corporate asset valuation and capital structure.5 Lambrecht
5Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) present a three-period industry equilibrium model where ﬁrms can adopt
diﬀerent technologies. They do not study entry and exit decisions. See Williams (1995) for an extension in
3(2001) analyzes the impact of debt ﬁnancing on entry and exit in an oligopoly environment.
Another strand is based on the framework developed by Hopenhayn (1992a, 1992b)
and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) where the concept of stationary equilibrium is in-
troduced to analyze industry dynamics. Most papers in this strand assume ﬁrms are all
equity ﬁnanced. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) introduce capital structure decisions into this
framework and study how ﬁnancial frictions account for the negative dependence of ﬁrm
dynamics (growth, job reallocation, and exit) on size and age. They assume exogenous exit
and consider standard one-period debt contracts based on asymmetric information. Their
analysis relies mainly on numerical method.
The third strand of literature is based on strategic models. Some papers in this strand
(Brander and Lewis (1986, 1988) and Maksimovic (1988)) argue that product market com-
petition becomes ‘tougher’ when leverage increases, while others (e.g., Poitevin (1989),
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), and Dasgupta and Titman (1998)) reach the opposite con-
clusion. Since most models in this strand are essentially static, it seems that they are not
suitable to address the questions of industry dynamics and corporate asset valuation.
My model combines elements of the ﬁrst two strands of literature. In particular, I
incorporate capital structure decisions into the framework of Hopenhayn (1992a) using the
contingent claims analysis. This allows me to derive a number of new predictions regarding
the relation between leverage and ﬁrm turnover. My model is also closely related to Fries
et al (1997) and Lambrecht (2001). Unlike Lambrecht (2001), I study perfectly competitive
industries. In addition, diﬀerent from these two papers where uncertainty comes from
aggregate industry demand shocks, I assume that ﬁrms face idiosyncratic technology shocks
as in Hopenhayn (1992a). The basic intuition behind the diﬀerence between ﬁrm-speciﬁc
shocks and industry-wide shocks is explained in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 8).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 studies a single ﬁrm’s optimal capital structure choice in an industry setting. Section 4
derives closed-form solutions for the unique equilibrium. Section 5 analyzes properties of
the equilibrium. Section 6 extends the model to allow for debt reorganization through debt
exchange oﬀers. Section 7 concludes. Technical details are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
Consider an industry consisting of a large number of ﬁrms. Suppose that information is
perfect and that all investors are risk neutral and discount future cash ﬂows at a constant
risk-free rate r>0. The assumption of risk neutrality does not lose any generality. If agents
a four-period model.
4are risk averse, the analysis may be conducted under the risk neutral measure (see Harrison
and Kreps (1979)).
Time is continuous and varies over [0,∞). Uncertainty is represented by a probability
space (Ω,F,P) on which all stochastic processes are deﬁned. The objective is to study
long-run stationary industry equilibria in which all industry-wide aggregate variables are
constant (see Section 2.4 for a formal deﬁnition). In particular, the equilibrium output price
is constant, and there is an equilibrium stationary distribution of surviving ﬁrms.
2.1 Industry Demand
Industry demand is given by a decreasing function. For simplicity, I take the following
iso-elastic functional form:
p = Y −1
ε, (1)
where p is the output price, Y is the industry output, and ε > 0 is the price elasticity of
demand.
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of ﬁrms. At each date, each ﬁrm suﬀers independently exogenous
death under the Poisson process with parameter η > 0. This assumption captures the fact
that some ﬁrms exit the industry for reasons that are not related to bankruptcy. In addition,
it is important to ensure the existence of a stationary distribution of ﬁrms studied later since
the technology shock is a nonstationary process, as I describe next.
Technology Each ﬁrm rents capital at the rental rate R to produce output with the
production function F : R+ → R+,F(k)=kν, where ν ∈ (0,1). The decreasing-returns-to-
scale assumption ensures that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is positive so that the decision problem of
entry and exit studied below is meaningful. Capital depreciates continuously at a constant
rate δ > 0. Thus the rental rate R is equal to r + δ.
Firms are ex ante identical in that their technology or productivity shocks are drawn
from the same distribution. They diﬀer ex post in the realization of idiosyncratic shocks.
Suppose that there is no aggregate uncertainty and a law of large numbers for a continuum
of random variables so that industry aggregates are constant (see Judd (1985), Feldman
and Gilles (1985), and Miao (2002)).
5For an individual ﬁrm, the technology shock process (zt)t≥0 is governed by a geometric
Brownian motion:
dzt/zt = µzdt + σzdWt, (2)
where µz and σz are positive constants. Here (Wt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion rep-
resenting ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty.
ProﬁtF u n c t i o n At each time each ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed operating cost cf > 0t op r o d u c e
output. Corporate income is taxed at the rate τ with full loss-oﬀset provisions.6 Deﬁne the
after-tax proﬁt function Ψ by
Ψ(z;p)=m a x
k≥0
(1 − τ)(pzF(k) − δk − cf) − rk. (3)
Notice that, according to the US tax system, the depreciation of capital is tax-deductible,
but the interest cost of capital is not. Proﬁt maximization implies the following neoclassical
investment rule:
pzF0(k)=r/(1 − τ)+δ. (4)
That is, the marginal product of capital is equal to the tax-adjusted user cost of capital.












where γ ≡ 1
1−ν. Substituting the above equation into (3) yields the after-tax proﬁt function
Ψ(z;p)=( 1− τ)[a(p)zγ − cf],
where






The before-tax proﬁt function is deﬁned as
π(z;p) ≡ a(p)zγ − cf. (7)
6I abstract from personal taxes in the paper.
6Debt Contracts Because interest payments to debt are tax deductible, each ﬁrm has
an incentive to issue debt. In order to obtain a closed-form solution, I consider a time-
homogenous environment where debt contracts have inﬁnite maturity, as in Leland (1994).
Debt is issued at par. The debt contract speciﬁes a perpetual ﬂow of coupon payments b to
bondholders. The remaining cash ﬂows from operation accrue to shareholders. If the ﬁrm
defaults on its debt obligations, it is immediately liquidated. Upon default, bondholders
get the liquidation value and shareholders get nothing.
Liquidation Value Suppose that debt reorganization is so costly that after default the
ﬁrm is immediately liquidated and exits the industry. Section 6 will relax this assumption
and consider debt reorganization. I model liquidation value as a fraction α ∈ (0,1) of
the unlevered ﬁrm value A(z;p). The remaining fraction accounts for bankruptcy costs.
One can model liquidation value as a general function of the output price X(p)a si nF r i e s
et al (1997). Here, I follow Mello and Parsons (1992). Unlevered ﬁrm value is equal to
the after-tax present value of proﬁts, plus the option value associated with abandonment
opportunities. Normalize the abandonment value of the ﬁrm to zero. Then, unlevered ﬁrm
value can be formally described by








where the maximization is over the set T of all stopping times relative to the ﬁltration
generated by the Brownian motion (Wt)t≥0,E z is the expectation operator for the process
(zt)t≥0 starting at z,a n dt h ef a c t o re−ηt accounts for the possibility of Poisson death.
Investment and Liquidation Decisions At each date t, after servicing coupon pay-
ments b, residual cash ﬂows (1 −τ)(pztF(kt) − δkt − cf − b)−rkt are distributed to share-
holders as dividends. Shareholders select the investment and default policy to maximize
the value of their claims. Assume that default is triggered by the decision of shareholders
to cease raising additional equity to meet the coupon payment, as in Mello and Parsons
(1992), Leland (1994), Fries et al (1997), Lambrecht (2001), and Duﬃe and Lando (2001).
The investment and liquidation decisions made by a typical ﬁrm with the current level
of technology shock z and coupon payment b are described by the following problem:





e−(r+η)t [(1 − τ)(pztF(kt) − δkt − cf − b) − rkt]dt
¾
. (9)









where π(zt;p) is given in (7). The expression e(z,b;p) represents the equity value of the
ﬁrm. Since one can show that it is increasing in z, the default decision is described by
a trigger policy whereby the ﬁrm is immediately liquidated and exits the industry once
its technology shock (zt)t≥0 falls below an endogenously determined threshold zd(b;p)( s e e
Duﬃe and Lando (2001)). In what follows, without risk of confusion, I may simply use zd
to denote zd(b;p).
The equity-value-maximizing investment policy is described by the neoclassical rule
(4), with the diﬀerence being that investment takes place only in the no default region
z>z d(b;p). This is related to the underinvestment problem of debt pointed out by Myers
(1977).
Notice that the limited liability feature of equity is embodied in problem (9) since
equity value is always positive before default (z>z d(b;p)), and is zero only upon default
(z = zd(b;p)).
Debt Value and Firm Value The arbitrage-free value of debt is equal to the sum of
the present value of coupon payments accruing to bondholders until the default time and











where Ty denotes the ﬁrst time that the process (zt)t≥0 falls to some boundary value y>0.
Firm value v(z,b;p) is the sum of equity value and debt value,
v(z,b;p)=e(z,b;p)+d(z,b;p).
Entry At each date there is a continuum of potential entrants. Entry incurs a ﬁxed sunk
cost ce. This cost can be ﬁnanced by equity and debt. After entry, a ﬁrm’s initial level
of technology z is drawn from the distribution ζ, which is uniform over [z,z]. This ﬁrm
is then in the same position as an incumbent with the initial level of technology z. The
uniform entry distribution is important to derive a closed-form solution for the stationary
distribution of incumbents.
Assume that z >z d(b;p). Since zd is endogenous, this assumption must be veriﬁed in
equilibrium. I rule out the case in which the initial draw of technology shock is below the
default threshold so that the entrant is immediately liquidated and exits the industry.
8Before entry, ﬁrms are identical and do not know their initial technology levels and
subsequent random evolution of technology. Thus, in a competitive equilibrium, if there is
positive entry, then the expected beneﬁt of entry must be equal to the entry cost. That is,




Finally, upon entry ﬁrms may adjust the capital structure in order to balance the beneﬁt
and cost of debt. The optimal coupon rate b∗(p) is chosen to maximize the expected value
of the ﬁrm
R z
z v(z,b;p)ζ(dz). Since all ﬁrms are ex ante identical, they choose the same
optimal coupon rate. For tractability, I assume that transactions costs are so high that
ﬁrms do not re-adjust debt after entry. Section 6 will discuss this further.
Time-line for Decisions In summary, the sequence of events and the timing of decisions


















Figure 1: Time-line for decisions
2.3 Aggregation
In a stationary equilibrium, there is a stationary distribution of surviving ﬁrms µ and a
constant entry rate N.7 Note that the distribution µ is not a probability measure. For any
7The entry (exit) rate is deﬁned as the number of ﬁrms entering (going bankrupt and exiting) the industry
at each time. The same term used in some empirical studies (e.g. Dunne et al (1988)) corresponds to the
turnover rate deﬁned later.
9Borel set B in the real line, µ(B) describes the mass of surviving ﬁrms with shocks in B.
Since the ﬁrm exits when its technology shock falls below zd(b;p), the support of µ is the










where k(z;p)a n dy(z;p)a r eg i v e ni n( 5 ) .
2.4 Equilibrium
A stationary industry equilibrium with exogenous leverage, (p∗,z e,N∗,µ ∗), consists of a con-
stant output price p∗, an exit threshold ze = zd(b;p∗), an entry rate N∗, and a distribution
of incumbents µ∗ such that: (i) Firms solve problem (9). (ii) The market clear:
p∗ = Y (µ∗,b;p∗)−1/ε. (14)
where Y (·) is given in (13). (iii) The entry condition (11) holds. (iv) The distributions µ∗








where 1 is an indicator function and Q(t,·,·) is the transition function of the process (zt)t≥0.
Note that equation (15) deﬁnes the stationary measure of incumbents, which is similar to
the discrete-time analog in Hopenhayn (1992a).
In this equilibrium, the coupon rate b is exogenously given. When b is chosen to maximize
ﬁrm value, the resulting equilibrium is called the stationary equilibrium with endogenous
leverage. Such an equilibrium is denoted by (po,z o
e,No,µ o).
I ti si m p o r t a n tt op o i n to u tt h a tt h ee x i tt h r e s h o l dd e t e r m i n e sn o to n l yaﬁrm’s liqui-
dation/exit decisions, but also the minimum eﬃciency level of surviving ﬁrms.
3 Optimal Capital Structure
In this section, I ﬁx the output price p and consider a single ﬁrm’s capital structure decision.
This decision is modelled in the spirit of the standard EBIT-based single-ﬁrm contingent-
claim models, such as Mello and Parsons (1992) and Goldstein et al (2001). However,
diﬀerent from these models, investment policies are not ﬁx e da n dt h ep r o d u c tm a r k e ti n ﬂu-
ences the capital structure decision through the output price.
103.1 Unlevered Firm Value
I begin by deriving unlevered ﬁrm value. Because unlevered ﬁrm value is increasing in z,
the solution to (8) is described by a threshold value zA. The ﬁrm is abandoned the ﬁrst
time when the technology shock falls below zA. To solve for this threshold value zA and







be unlevered ﬁrm value given any threshold level y>0. Here Ty denotes the ﬁrst passage
time of the process (zt)t≥0 starting from z to y.















where a(p)i sg i v e nb y( 6 )a n d
λ ≡ r + η − µzγ − σ2
zγ(γ − 1)/2. (17)
To ensure that Π(z;p)i sﬁnite, I assume λ > 0.
In the appendix, I show that




















The abandonment threshold zA is determined by the smooth-pasting condition
∂A(z;p|zA)
∂z
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
z=zA
=0 .




(ϑ − γ)(r + η)a(p)
¸1/γ
. (20)
Thus, unlevered ﬁrm value is given by






The second term represents the option value of abandonment.
113.2 Liquidation Decision and Equity Value
Recall that the ﬁrm’s liquidation decision is described by a trigger policy. To solve for






denote the equity value when the default threshold is given by y and the coupon rate is

















Since shareholders may always cover operating losses by raising additional equity, they
choose a default threshold y so as to maximize equity value e(z,b;p|y). The optimal default
threshold zd satisﬁes the smooth-pasting condition
∂e(z,b;p|zd)
∂z

















Thus, the optimal liquidation policy for shareholders consists in liquidating when the present
value of the proﬁt ﬂow upon default Π(zd;p) is equal to the cost of servicing debt b/(r +η)
multiplied by the factor ϑ/(ϑ − γ) ∈ (0,1) that represents an option value of waiting to
default. It is important to note that unlike single-ﬁrm models, product market behavior
aﬀects the liquidation decision because the output price aﬀects the present value of the
proﬁt ﬂow.
Equation (23) also implies that the liquidation threshold zd(b;p)i si n c r e a s i n gi nb and
decreasing in p (note that a(p)i si n c r e a s i n gi np). Thus, higher debt or lower output price
causes the ﬁrm to exit earlier. Higher debt also induces underinvestment as in Myers (1977)
in the sense that the range of the states over which investment takes place is smaller.
















12Thus, equity value is equal to the after-tax value of the present value of the proﬁt ﬂow,
minus the present value of coupon payments, plus the option value of default.
3.3 Debt Value and Firm Value














Thus, debt value is equal to the present value of coupon payments, plus the probability-
adjusted changes in value if and when default occurs. Note that, under the present speci-
ﬁcation of liquidation value, one can show that αA(zd;p) < b
r+η so that debt is risky, i.e.,
d(z,b;p) < b
r+η.

















for z ≥ zd. This implies that levered ﬁrm value equals unlevered ﬁrm value plus the
probability-adjusted tax shield of debt minus probability-adjusted bankruptcy costs.
3.4 Optimal Coupon
Upon entry, the ﬁrm adjusts its capital structure to balance the beneﬁt and cost of debt.






Since it can be shown that v is strictly concave in b, the following ﬁrst-order condition















































(ϑ +1 ) ( z − z)
.
T h ee x p r e s s i o no nt h el e f ts i d eo fe q u a t i o n( 29) represents the probability-adjusted
marginal tax advantage of debt and the expression on the right side represents the marginal
bankruptcy cost. In particular, the ﬁrst term on the right side represents the loss of marginal
tax shield due to bankruptcy. The second term on the right side represents the loss of
marginal liquidation value due to an ineﬃcient choice of liquidation time by the shareholder.
The optimal capital structure prescribes a coupon rate so that the marginal beneﬁto fd e b t
equals the marginal cost.
Unlike single-ﬁrm models, the present model implies that product market competition
inﬂuences the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decisions since industry output price aﬀects the optimal
coupon rate. This is transparent when there is no ﬁxed operating cost (cf =0 ) . In this case,
there is a closed form solution to (29):
b∗(p)=















This equation implies that the optimal coupon is increasing in the output price p.T h e
intuition is that, when the output price p is higher, the ﬁrm is less likely to default so that
it prefers to issue more debt.
3.5 Agency Costs
Given the coupon rate b and the technology shock z,t h eﬁrm’s ﬁrst-best liquidation policy is
to choose a liquidation threshold zFB
d so as to maximize ﬁrm value, instead of equity value.
Since upon default the ﬁrm only recovers a fraction of unlevered ﬁrm value, it prefers to
postpone default as late as possible in order to beneﬁtf r o mt a xs h i e l d s . H o w e v e r ,t h e
ﬁrm also incurs the ﬁxed operating cost, and hence eventually suﬀers losses. Consequently,
it is optimal to default at the abandonment threshold value zA(p), i.e., zFB
d = zA. Since
zFB
d <z d, the equity-maximizing liquidation policy implies an ineﬃcient early liquidation
time.

















14Simple algebra shows that v(z,b;p|y) is decreasing in y. Thus, the value-maximizing liqui-
dation threshold zFB










That is, the ﬁrst-best ﬁrm value is equal to unlevered ﬁrm value plus the probability-adjusted
tax shield.
Due to the conﬂict of interest between shareholders and bondholders, the ﬁrst-best
liquidation policy cannot be enforced ex post. These agency costs are measured by the
diﬀerence between the ﬁrst-best ﬁrm value and ﬁrm value under the liquidation policy
chosen by the shareholder. Formally, given the coupon rate b and the technology shock z,
agency costs are given by:



















Thus, agency costs consist of the loss of tax shields due to ineﬃcient liquidation and the
probability adjusted liquidation costs.
4 Stationary Equilibrium
This section derives a closed-form solution for the stationary equilibrium. I ﬁrst consider
the case where leverage is exogenous. Then I consider the case where leverage is chosen
optimally. In both cases, the stationary equilibrium is unique and is obtained in closed
form. The solution method follows from a similar procedure described in Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993). It consists of three steps. The ﬁrst step uses the entry condition (11)
to determine the output price p∗, the second step uses condition (v) in the deﬁnition of
equilibrium to ﬁnd the invariant measure µ∗ up to the scale factor N∗, and the third step
uses the market clearing condition (iii) to determine the entry rate N∗.
4.1 Equilibrium with Exogenous Leverage
Throughout this subsection, the coupon rate b is assumed to be ﬁxed exogenously.
Output Price It is easy to show that ﬁrm value v is strictly increasing in the output
price p. When the output price is high enough, ﬁr mv a l u ee x c e e d st h ee n t r yc o s tce. Then
15potential entrants have incentives to enter the industry. As more ﬁrms enter the industry,
market competition drives down the output price. On the other hand, when the output
price is low enough, ﬁrm value may be lower than the entry cost. In this case, no ﬁrm
prefers to enter the industry. In sum, if there is positive entry, the equilibrium output price
is determined by the entry condition (11). In particular, as p goes to inﬁnity, the ﬁrm makes
unbounded proﬁts and hence v goes to inﬁnity. However, as p goes to zero, the ﬁrm becomes
unproﬁtable so that it is abandoned and v goes to zero. Thus, a unique equilibrium output
price p∗ is determined, as illustrated in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Exit Threshold Substituting the expressions for p∗ into (6) and then substituting the




(ϑ − γ)(r + η)a(p∗)
¸1/γ
. (33)
This equation reveals that the impact of the product market competition on a ﬁrm’s ﬁnanc-
ing and liquidation/exit decisions is transmitted through the equilibrium output price.
Stationary Distribution of Incumbents Given the exit threshold ze, the support of
the stationary distribution of incumbents µ∗ is [ze,∞). Note that equation (15) implies that
µ∗ is linearly homogenous in N∗. Thus, it is convenient to scale µ∗ by the factor N∗ when






G1zβ1−1 + G2zβ2−1, for ze <z≤ z,
A1zβ1−1 + A2zβ2−1 + 1
(z−z)(η+µz−σ2
z), for z <z≤ z,
H1zβ1−1, for z>z.
(34)
where β1,β2,A 1,A 2,G 1,G 2 and H1 are given in the appendix. The main idea to derive this
d e n s i t yi st h a tf o rt h i sd e n s i t yt ob ec o n s t a n to v e rt i m e ,t h er a t ea tw h i c hﬁrms arrive at
any technology level in the support of the density is equal to the rate at which ﬁrms move
away from that level (possibly suﬀering Poisson death).
The following lemma ensures that the signs of some equilibrium variables studied later
make economic sense.
Lemma 1 Assume η+µz−σ2
z > 0. Then β1 < 0, β2 > 1,A 1 < 0,A 2 < 0,G 1 < 0,G 2 > 0,
H1 > 0. Moreover, f(z) > 0 for all z>z e.
16Entry Rate The entry rate N∗ is determined by the market-clearing condition (14).












for all χ < −β1. The restriction χ < −β1 ensures that I(χ)i sﬁnite. Equation (36) will be
used repeatedly later and its explicit expression is given in the appendix.







Turnover Rate The turnover rate is an important measure of industry dynamics (see
Dunne et al (1988) and Hopenhayn (1992a)). The turnover rate of entry is deﬁned as the
ratio of the mass of entrants to the mass of incumbents. The turnover rate of exit can be
deﬁned similarly. Since in a stationary equilibrium the entry rate is equal to the exit rate,
these two measures of turnover are equal.








f(z)dz = N∗I(0). (38)






Thus, the turnover rate of entry is equal to the inverse of the full measure implied by the
scaled density f.











17where cA is given in (32). Following Mello and Parsons (1992), the magnitude of average
industry agency costs can be measured as the percentage of the average industry ﬁrst-best
ﬁrm value.
In summary, the above analysis implies the following characterization of the unique
stationary equilibrium:
Theorem 2 Assume that λ > 0, η + µz > σ2
z and β1 + γ < 0,w h e r eβ1 i sg i v e ni nt h e
appendix and λ i sg i v e ni n( 1 7 ) . Then there is a unique stationary equilibrium with the
coupon rate b, (p∗,z e,N∗,µ ∗), such that z >z e. It is characterized by equations (11), (33),
(34), and (37).
The assumptions λ > 0a n dβ1 + γ < 0 ensure that the present value of the proﬁt ﬂow
and the integrals I(γ),I (0) and I(ϑ)a r eﬁnite. The assumption η + µz > σ2
z ensures that
the condition in Lemma 1 is satisﬁed. Finally, the requirement z >z e guarantees that the
initial draw of technology shock is not trivial in the sense that no ﬁrm immediately exits
upon entry.
Note that when there is no debt (i.e., b =0 ) ,ﬁrms are all equity ﬁnanced and the
model reduces to the industry dynamics model studied by Hopenhayn (1992a). The only
diﬀerence is that here the technology shock is modelled as a geometric Brownian motion
process, whereas it is modelled as a mean reversion process in Hopenhayn (1992a).
4.2 Equilibrium with Endogenous Leverage
If the ﬁrm chooses its optimal capital structure, then it selects the coupon rate b∗(p)t os o l v e




Now, the equilibrium with endogenous leverage can be characterized in the same manner
as that with exogenous leverage except for the following changes: (i) the output price p∗ is
replaced by the above value po, (ii) the coupon rate b takes the value bo ≡ b∗(po), and (iii)
the exit threshold ze takes the value zo
e = ze(bo;po). I omit the details.
Importantly, if there is no ﬁxed operating cost (i.e., cf = 0), then the equilibrium
with endogenous leverage can be characterized completely in closed-form. Speciﬁcally, the
























Notice that this expression implies that the exit threshold does not depend on the output
price. This result is not robust to the introduction of the ﬁxed operating cost.
Substituting (27), (30), and (41) into (40), one can solve for the unique equilibrium






















Once the equilibrium output price and exit threshold are obtained, the equilibrium entry
rate No and the equilibrium stationary distribution of incumbents µo can be derived in the
same manner as before. Hence, the unique stationary equilibrium (po,zo
e,No,µ o)i sf u l l y
characterized.
5R e s u l t s
To examine the implications of the model, I ﬁrst calibrate a base case model. I then conduct
simulations based on this model. For all simulations, input parameter values are chosen
such that the conditions of Theorem 2 are satisﬁed.
5.1 Calibration
The base case model studies the equilibrium with optimal leverage. The calibration of
parameters follows a standard procedure in the business cycle literature (e.g., Kydland and
Prescott (1982)). Namely, the parameter values are either estimated directly from the data
or chosen such that the model’s equilibrium behavior matches some measured statistics as
closely as possible.
I ﬁrst set the ﬁxed operating cost cf = 0 so that there is a closed-form solution to the
unique equilibrium. I then set the price elasticity of demand ε =0 .75. This number is
within the range estimated by Phillips (1995).
Next, I calibrate parameters related to technology. Set the returns-to-scale parameter
ν =0 .40, as estimated by Caballero and Engel (1999). This implies γ =1 /(1− ν)=1 .667.
As in the business cycle literature, set the depreciation rate of capital δ =0 .1. In order to
19calibrate the drift µz and volatility σz, use π(zt;p)t op r o x yaﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. The growth
rate and volatility of cash ﬂows are roughly equal to 2.5% and 25% for a typical Standard &
Poor’s 500 ﬁrm. Thus, apply Ito’s Lemma to equation (3) to derive that σz =0 .25/γ =1 5 %
and µz =( 0 .025 − 0.5γ(γ − 1)σ2
z)/γ =0 .75%
Set the risk free r =5 .22% so that it is equal to the rate on 10-year Treasury bonds
as of January 30, 2001, as reported in the February 7, 2001 edition of Standard & Poor’s
The Outlook. Set the corporate tax rate τ = 34%, as estimated by Graham (1996). Set the
bankruptcy cost parameter 1 − α = 20%, which is at the upper bound of recent estimates
reported in Andrade and Kaplan (1998).
Set the Poisson death parameter η =4 % . This number follows from the facts that the
annual turnover rate is roughly 7% (see Dunne et al (1988) and Hopenhayn (1992b)) and
that the default rate is roughly 3% (see Brady and Bos (2002)).
It remains to calibrate the parameters ce,z , and z. First, follow Hopenhayn (1992b)
and normalize the equilibrium output price po =1 . Next, use equation (40) to determine ce
once z and z are known. Finally, choose values for z and z so that the following numbers
are roughly matched: (i) The average industry Tobin’s q is equal to 2.7, w h i c hi si nt h e
range estimated by Lindenberg and Ross (1981). (ii) The turnover rate is 7%.
The base case parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 here]
5.2 The Base Case Model
The equilibrium for the base case model is reported in the ﬁr s tr o wo fT a b l e2 . I ts h o w s
that the average industry leverage ratio is equal to 23.09%. This number is close to the
historical average leverage ratio (25%) reported in Barclay et al (2002). To compare with
the standard single ﬁrm EBIT-based contingent claims model, I adopt the same parameter
values for a single risk neutral ﬁrm. The optimal leverage ratio is 71.59%, which is much
higher than that typically observed in practice.8 The main reason that the present model
predicts low leverage is that I compute equilibrium average industry leverage level, instead
of a single ﬁrm’s leverage. In a stationary equilibrium, there are not many surviving ﬁrms
having high leverage levels.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
8For a wide range of reasonable parameter values, the Leland-style single ﬁrm contingent claims model
typically predicts a much higher leverage ratio than that observed in practice. However, dynamic capital
structure models such as Goldstein et al (2001), Ju et al (2003), and Miao and Morellec (2003) can predict
lower leverage ratios .
















The value is 7.08%, which is close to the estimate (9.7%) reported in Graham (2000).
Figure 3 plots the stationary distribution of surviving ﬁrms. This ﬁgure implies that
more eﬃcient ﬁrms are less likely to exit, since they have higher technology (productivity)
levels which are farther away from the exit threshold. This prediction is consistent with the
empirical ﬁnding reported by Kovenock and Phillips (1997).
Another property of the base case model is that although all ﬁrms in the industry are
ex ante identical, and hence pay the same amount of coupon, the leverage ratios vary across
ﬁrms. This is because surviving ﬁrms diﬀer in realizations of technology shocks so that they
have diﬀerent equity value.9 This result is related to the empirical ﬁnding of Welch (2004)
that leverage changes are mainly determined by equity returns.
Simulations reported in Table 2 also reveal that agency costs account for 2.57% of the
ﬁrst-best ﬁrm value. In later simulations, I ﬁnd that the magnitude of agency costs is
approximately 2% for a wide range of parameter values. Thus, the agency costs arising
from the conﬂict of interest between shareholders and bondholders are quite small. A
similar ﬁnding is reported in Parrino and Weisbach (1999).
To compare with Hopenhayn’s (1992a) industry dynamics model without debt ﬁnancing,
Is e tt h eﬁxed operating cost cf = 5 and compute equilibria with and without debt ﬁnancing.
The equilibrium outcome for the model with debt ﬁnancing is reported in the 12th row of
Table 2. By contrast, when ﬁrms do not take into account tax advantages of debt and are all
equity ﬁnanced, industry output is 0.72, the turnover rate is 4.77%, and average industry
ﬁrm value is $372.12, all of which are lower than the model with debt ﬁnancing. Thus,
debt ﬁnancing not only raises ﬁrm value,10 but also facilitates eﬃcient exit and increases
industry output. The intuition is simple. Debt increases the exit threshold (see equations
(20) and (23)), and hence induces ineﬃcient ﬁrms to exit. In addition, increased ﬁrm value
promotes entry. Competition then drives down the output price and raises industry output.
5.3 Comparative Statics
Since capital structure and production decisions may simultaneously respond to changes in
exogenous factors, I focus on the stationary equilibrium with optimal leverage and examine
9Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) attribute the variation of capital structures to the adoption of diﬀerent
technologies within the industry.
10Average industry ﬁrm value is $395.57 in the present model. This number is not reported in Table 2.
21comparative static properties of the equilibrium based on the base case model studied earlier.
Technology Growth and Entry Distribution Figure 3 plots the impact of technology
growth on average industry leverage, industry output, and the turnover rate. As argued
in the introduction, the standard single ﬁrm tradeoﬀ model cannot explain the empirical
evidence that high-growth ﬁrms have low leverage. However, in the present industry equi-
librium framework, the tradeoﬀ theory can still explain this fact. This is because the price
feedback eﬀect discussed in the introduction plays an important role. Simulations reported
in Table 2 show that this eﬀect dominates so that the optimal coupon rate falls and the
liquidation threshold rises with technology growth µz. Table 2 also reveals that the tax
beneﬁt of debt falls and average industry leverage falls with µz.
Since the market-to-book ratio is positively related to technology growth,11 it is neg-
atively related to leverage. The usual interpretation of this fact is based on the underin-
vestment problem of debt identiﬁed by Myers (1977) or the free cash ﬂow theory of Jensen
(1986). Two recent interpretations are oﬀered by Welch (2002) and Baker and Wurgler
(2002). The present model, however, oﬀers a new interpretation in an industry equilibrium
setting.
To examine why the price feedback eﬀect may dominate and how robust the result is,













where I have substituted the expressions for a(p)a n dλ, (6), and (17). If Π(z;p)i sp r i c e
elastic (i.e., γ > 1), and if the level and changes of the growth rate µz are small, then the
decrease in the price p may well dominate the increase in µz. In the present model, under
decreasing-returns-to-scale technology, γ must be bigger than 1. Moreover, for a typical
ﬁrm the growth rate of cash ﬂows and its change are unlikely to be high. Therefore, I
conclude that the result is quite robust for a wide range of reasonable parameter values.
T h ei n c r e a s ei nµz also has a positive selection eﬀect because it changes the liquidation
threshold and the stationary distribution of ﬁrms. Figure 4 illustrates that this eﬀect causes
the scaled density function to shift to the right. Thus, to survive in the industry, ﬁrms must
have high productivity or technology levels. This makes entry tougher. Thus, the turnover
rate decreases. Formally, this can be seen from equation (39) because the full measure
implied by the density f rises with µz.
11Simulations (not reported in Table 2) conﬁrms this positive correlation. The market-to-book ratio is a
commonly used proxy for growth opportunities.
22[Insert Figures 3 and 4 Here]
Notice that even though the increase in technology growth may cut the present value
of proﬁts, the average industry equity value and ﬁrm value rise with technology growth.
Simulations show that, when µz increases from 0.75% to 1.5%, average industry equity value
increases from $203.57 to $1338.2 and average industry ﬁrm value increases from $264.68
to $1400.8. This is because those values are computed using the stationary distribution of





In addition, the positive selection eﬀect implies that a high-growth industry has a greater
number of highly eﬃcient ﬁrms than a low-growth industry. These highly eﬃcient ﬁrms
have higher equity value and ﬁrm value. Furthermore, simulations show that the size M0
of the high-growth industry is much lower than that of the low-growth industry.
T h ei m p a c to fa ni m p r o v e m e n to ft h ee n t r yd i s t r i b u t i o n( i . e . ,a ni n c r e a s ei nz) is similar
to that of an increase in technology growth, as reported in Table 2. So I omit the discussion.
Risks of Technology Figure 5 plots the relation between technology volatility, average
industry leverage, industry output, and the turnover rate. As in the standard contingent
claims model, the volatility parameter σz provides a measure of bankruptcy risk and hence
is an important determinant of leverage. Figure 5 reveals that volatility is negatively related
to average industry leverage. This prediction is similar to that in the single ﬁrm model and
is consistent with the empirical evidence documented by Titman and Wessels (1988).
[Insert Figures 5-6 Here]
Figure 5 also reveals that volatility is positively related to industry output. This is
because an increase in σz has an option eﬀect in that it raises the option value of waiting
to default. This results in higher ﬁrm value and hence encourages entry. Competition then
drives down the output price and raises industry output.
Figure 5 reveals that volatility is positively related to the turnover rate. This is due to
the selection eﬀect, as illustrated in Figure 6. Simulations reported in Table 2 show that
the selection eﬀect causes the full measure implied by the scaled density f to decrease with
volatility, leading to an increased turnover rate.
Bankruptcy Cost and Corporate Tax An increase in the bankruptcy cost parameter
1 − α has a negative cash ﬂow eﬀect. This eﬀect decreases the value of an active ﬁrm and
depresses entry. As a result, the output price rises and industry output falls. Figure 7 plots
the impact of the bankruptcy cost on industry output, as well as its impact on average
industry leverage and the turnover rate.
23While it is intuitive that bankruptcy costs are negatively related to leverage, Figure 7
also reveals that bankruptcy costs are negatively related to the turnover rate. The intuition
is that an increase in the bankruptcy cost lowers debt and hence decreases the opportunity
cost of remaining active. Thus, each incumbent prefers to stay longer in the industry.
Consequently, the liquidation threshold falls as reported in Table 2. The lower value of
the liquidation threshold implies less selection and higher expected lifetime of ﬁrms. As a
result, the turnover rate falls. Figure 8 illustrates the selection eﬀect.
[Insert Figures 7-9 Here]
An increase in the corporate tax rate has the same negative cash ﬂow eﬀect as an
increase in the bankruptcy cost so that industry output falls with the tax rate. However,
the increase in the corporate tax rate has an opposite eﬀect on leverage and turnover to an
increase in the bankruptcy cost, as reported in Table 2 and Figure 9. I omit the detailed
analysis.
Fixed Operating Cost So far, I have set the ﬁxed operating cost cf to be zero. Because
the ﬁxed cost is related to the degree of economies of scale, I now examine the impact of
the ﬁxed operating cost on equilibrium outcomes, which is illustrated in Figure 10.12
Figure 10 reveals that the ﬁxed cost is positively related to the turnover rate, and
negatively related to industry output and leverage. The intuition is as follows. An increase
in the ﬁxed operating cost lowers the operating proﬁt and hence lowers ﬁrm value. This
depresses entry, raises the output price, and hence lowers industry output. As reported in
Table 2, the positive price feedback eﬀect is dominated so that each incumbent prefers to
exit earlier, resulting in an increased exit threshold and an increased turnover rate. This
positive selection eﬀect is illustrated in Figure 11.
[Insert Figures 10-11 Here]
I now analyze the impact on leverage. While the increased ﬁxed cost lowers the tax
beneﬁt of debt, it also lowers unlevered ﬁrm value and hence bankruptcy costs. Simulations
reported in Table 2 reveals that the latter eﬀect dominates so that the optimal coupon rises.
Thus, the average industry value of debt also rises. However, due to the positive selection
and price eﬀects, average industry ﬁrm value also increases with the ﬁxed cost. The intuition
is that, following an increase in the ﬁxed cost, surviving ﬁrms are more eﬃcient since the
12As a robustness check, I redo all previous simulations for a number of positive values of the entry cost.
I ﬁnd the results do not change qualitatively.
24exit threshold is higher and the positive price eﬀect is stronger for those ﬁrms. A similar
result is derived in Hopenhayn (1992a,b) for all equity ﬁnanced ﬁrms. Simulations reported
i nT a b l e2s h o wt h a tt h ei n c r e a s ei nﬁrm value dominates the increase in debt value so that
average industry leverage falls with the ﬁxed cost.
Entry Cost In the short run, an increase in the entry cost ce does not aﬀect a ﬁrm’s
cash ﬂows and its liquidation decision. Thus, it does not aﬀect the value of an active ﬁrm.
However, the entry cost acts as a barrier to entry. High entry costs protect incumbents
and drive up the industry output price. This price feedback eﬀect will generally inﬂuence
ﬁnancing and exit decisions.
Speciﬁcally, the increase in the output price raises the beneﬁt of remaining active and
the tax advantage of debt. Thus, each ﬁrm prefers to issue more debt and hence the optimal
coupon rises. However, this leads to an increased opportunity cost of remaining active. The
impact on the exit threshold depends on these two opposite eﬀects as shown in equation
(24). When there is no ﬁxed operating cost, these eﬀects oﬀset each other so that changes
in the entry cost do not aﬀect the exit threshold (see equation (41)). Consequently, these
changes do not have a selection eﬀect.
However, this result is not robust to the introduction of the ﬁxed operating cost. To
illustrate this point, I set the operating cost cf =5 . Figure 12 plots the impact of the
entry cost on leverage, output, and the turnover rate. It reveals that the entry cost is
positively related to leverage and negatively related to the turnover rate.13 The intuition is
that, following an increase in the entry cost, the positive price feedback eﬀect dominates so
that the exit threshold decreases (see simulations reported in Table 2). Thus, default/exit
probabilities are lower, and hence expected bankruptcy costs are lower. This results in
higher leverage.
The negative relation between the entry cost and the turnover rate is due to the negative
selection eﬀect, as illustrated in Figure 13. This prediction is consistent with the evidence
reported by Orr (1974) for Canadian industry. A similar result is derived by Hopenhayn
(1992a) for all equity ﬁnanced ﬁrms.
[Insert Figures 12-13 Here]
13This result does not depend on the choice of cf =5s i n c ei ti sv e r i ﬁed by simulations for many other
values of cf.
256 Debt Reorganization
So far, I have assumed that the capital structure decision is made ex ante at the entry stage
and then ﬁxed throughout the ﬁrm’s lifetime. However, ﬁrms may re-adjust their debt levels
ex post either because technology may improve over time so that ﬁrms prefer to issue more
debt or because technology shock is bad enough so that ﬁrms are in ﬁnancial distress and
prefer to reorganize debt.
Contingent-claim models of debt reorganization and dynamic capital structure include
Fischer et al (1989), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Leland (1998), Mella-Barral (1995,
1999), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Goldstein et al (2001), Fran¸ cois and Morellec (2002),
Titman and Tsyplakov (2002), Ju et al (2003), and Miao and Morellec (2003) among others.
I argue that as long as there is a stationary liquidation threshold, these models can be
embedded in the present industry equilibrium framework. To illustrate this point, I consider
a simple model where debt is reorganized when ﬁrms are in ﬁnancial distress. Gilson, Kose,
and Lang (1990) ﬁnd that almost half the companies in ﬁnancial distress avoid liquidation
through out-of-court debt reorganization (also see Franks and Torous (1994)).
I consider a particular type of out-of-court debt reorganization — debt exchange oﬀers.
In a debt exchange oﬀer, bondholders exchange their old debt contract for a new one with a
reduced coupon repayment. I adopt the model of debt exchange oﬀers developed by Mella-
Barral (1995). This model is also applied by Lambrecht (2001) in a duopoly framework.
By contrast, I study debt exchange oﬀers in a perfectly competitive industry framework.
Consider a single ﬁrm’s decision in a competitive industry with the output price p.
Assume that all debt is held by a bank and debt reorganization takes place through a one-
oﬀ take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer made by management. Furthermore, assume that shareholders
are unwilling to postpone debt exchange oﬀers beyond the point where direct liquidation
becomes optimal. Similar assumptions are made in Mella-Barral (1995) and Lambrecht
(2001).
A debt exchange occurs when the technology shock falls below a threshold level zx.A t
this point, the existing debt contract is swapped for a new one with coupon b which is less
than the old coupon b. The previous assumption implies that zx ≥ zd(b;p), where zd(b;p)
is the liquidation threshold for the old debt contract; it is given in (23).
I start by deriving equity value and debt value when the ﬁrm has a debt exchange option
available.
Proposition 3 Suppose that at the ﬁrst time when the technology shock falls below a thresh-
old value zx the old debt contract with coupon b is exchanged for a new contract with reduced
coupon b. Then the value of the equity and the debt prior to reorganization are respectively
26given by
ex(z,zx,b,b;p)































I next determine the optimal timing of the debt exchange and the corresponding new
coupon, i.e., (zx,b). Assume that shareholders have all the bargaining power so that manage-
ment maximizes equity value subject to the constraint that the bank is indiﬀerent between
accepting or rejecting the oﬀer. That is, debt value after a successful debt exchange is equal




ex(zt,z x,b,b;p),z t ≥ zx,
subject to
d(zx,b;p)=d(zx,b;p). (45)
Solving this problem leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The optimal debt exchange oﬀer happens when the ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to
















After analyzing a single ﬁrm’s debt exchange oﬀer decision, I now turn to the stationary
industry equilibrium. As in section 3, the equilibrium output price p∗ is determined by
the entry condition. That is, the ex ante value of the ﬁrm is equal to the entry cost. The
exit threshold ze is then given by ze = zd(b;p∗). The equilibrium stationary distribution
of surviving ﬁrms µ∗ has the support [zd(b;p∗),∞). Diﬀerent from the model analyzed in
previous sections, surviving ﬁrms may issue diﬀerent amounts of debt because some ﬁrms
may reorganize their debt.
In the above analysis, I assume the initial coupon b is ﬁxed and determine optimal debt
exchange oﬀers given b. Recognizing future debt exchange options and the impact of debt
on ﬁrms’ production, entry and exit decisions, ﬁrms have incentives to choose optimal b so
as to maximize ex ante ﬁrm value as in section 4.2. A thorough quantitative analysis as in
section 5 is beyond the scope of the present paper.
277C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I present an equilibrium model of industry dynamics and capital structure
decisions. I show that technology (productivity) heterogeneity is important in determining
a ﬁrm’s survival probabilities and leverage ratio. In particular, in equilibrium there is a
stationary distribution of surviving ﬁrms. These ﬁrms exhibit a wide variation of capital
structures. In addition, more eﬃcient ﬁrms are less likely to exit. Finally, I analyze compar-
ative static properties of changes in technology growth, technology risk, entry distribution,
entry cost, ﬁxed cost, bankruptcy cost, and tax policy.
The analysis reveals that the interaction between ﬁnancing and production decisions is
important in industry equilibrium. In particular, it shows that several conclusions reached
in standard single-ﬁrm contingent claims models do not hold true in an equilibrium setting.
Moreover, it moves predictions in the right direction in terms of reconciling the evidence.
Speciﬁcally, the analysis shows that either one of the following exogenous factors can si-
multaneously explain the empirical ﬁndings mentioned in the introduction: the slowdown
of technology (productivity) growth, the deterioration of entry distribution, or the increase
in the corporate tax rate.
The paper also provides a number of new testable predictions regarding capital struc-
ture and industry dynamics. First, industries associated with high technology growth and
better entry distribution tend to have low average leverage, low turnover rates, and high
output. Second, industries associated with high risks of technology tend to have low av-
erage leverage, high turnover rates, and high output. Third, industries associated with
high bankruptcy costs tend to have low average leverage, low turnover rates, and low out-
put. Fourth, industries associated with high ﬁxed operating costs tend to have low average
leverage, high turnover rates, and low output. Finally, industries associated with high entry
costs tend to have high average leverage, low turnover rates, and low output.
The paper could be extended in several directions, which are left for future research.
First, in the paper, the expected returns of equity and other macroeconomic variables
are constant. To study equity premium and other time series behavior of the industry,
it is necessary to introduce aggregate uncertainty. Second, this paper considers only the
conﬂict of interest between shareholders and bondholders. It would be interesting to study
the conﬂict of interest between shareholders and managers. Third, in section 6, I outline a
simple industry equilibrium model of debt reorganization. It would be interesting to consider
a richer model of dynamic capital structure. Finally, it would be interesting to consider
ﬁnite maturity debt. This requires a constant default threshold in stationary equilibrium,
which can be delivered using the framework of Leland and Toft (1996) or Leland (1998).
28AA p p e n d i x
Derivation of equity value (22) and unlevered ﬁrm value (18):

































where the last equality follows from the strong Markov property of the process (zt)t≥0 (see












where ϑ is given in (19). Equation (22) follows from the above expressions and (16).
Equation (18) can be derived by letting b = 0 in the above analysis.
Derivation of the stationary distribution of ﬁrms:
It is convenient to work in terms of the logarithm, x =l o gz.T h e n( xt)i saB r o w n i a n
motion satisfying:
dxt = µxdt + σxdWt,
where µx = µz − 1
2σ2
z and σx = σz. Because the initial draw of z is uniform over [z,z], the
initial draw of x =l o g ( z) has an exponential distribution over [x,x]w h e r ex =l o gz and
x =l o gz. This distribution has a density function
g(x)=e x p ( x − b x),
where b x =l o g ( z − z).
Let the stationary distribution of incumbent ﬁrms have a density function N∗φ(x)o n
[xe,∞), where xe =l o g ( ze)a n dN∗ is the entry rate determined later. I will now use the
Kolmogorov equation to ﬁnd the function φ(x) by considering three cases.
29I adapt the heuristic argument from Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 8). First, approx-
imate the Brownian motion by a random walk. To do so, divide time into short intervals
of duration dt, and the x space into short segments, each of length dh = σx
√
dt. Of the
ﬁrms located in one such segment, during time dt ap r o p o r t i o nηdt will die. Of the rest, a






















Now consider the ﬁr s tc a s ew h e r ex ≤ x<x. Then there are new entrants having the
shock x since the support of their initial draw of shocks is [x,x]. There are N∗φ(x)dh ﬁrms
in the segment centered at x. In the next unit of time period dt, all of these move away
with either Poisson or Brownian shocks. New entrants, as well as ﬁrms from the left and
right, arrive to take their places. For balance,
N∗φ(x)dh = N∗dtg(x)dh + p(1 − ηdt)N∗φ(x − dh)dh
+q(1 − ηdt)N∗φ(x + dh)dh.




xφ00(x) − µxφ0(x) − ηφ(x)+g(x)=0 .
A particular solution to this equation can be derived as
φ0(x)=ex−b x/(η + µx − σ2
x/2).
To make economic sense, I assume that η +µx −σ2
x/2=η +µz −σ2
z > 0. Then the general
solution is given by



















and A1 and A2 are constants to be determined.
In the second case, xe <x<x , there is no new entrant in the segment centered at x.




xφ00(x) − µxφ0(x) − ηφ(x)=0 .
30The general solution to this equation is given by
φ(x)=G1eβ1x + G2eβ2x, for xe <x<x ,
where G1 and G2 are constants to be determined.
In the third case, x ≥ x, there is no new entrant in the segment centered at x either so
that φ still satisﬁes the above ODE. Let the solution be
φ(x)=H1eβ1x + H2eβ2x, for x ≥ x,
where H1 and H2 are constants to be determined.
In terms of z, the density function of µ∗ is given by N∗f(z)=N∗
z φ(log(z)), which gives
(34).


























Equation (47) says that the total mass of incumbents must be ﬁnite. Equation (48) is
derived from the fact that when the process (xt)f a l l st oxd, the ﬁrm exits the industry.
Finally, equations (49)-(52) follow from Theorem 4.4.9 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991, p.
271). Using these equations, one can derive that H2 =0a n dG1,G 2,A 1,A 2,H 1 solve the
following system of linear equations:
G1eβ1xe + G2eβ2xe =0 ,
G1eβ1x + G2eβ2x = A1eβ1x + A2eβ2x + φ0(x),
G1β1eβ1x + G2β2eβ2x = A1β1eβ1x + A2β2eβ2x + φ0
0(x),
A1eβ1x + A2eβ2x + φ0(x)=H1eβ1x,
A1β1eβ1x + A2β2eβ2x + φ0
0(x)=H1β1eβ1x.




























(1 − β1)(z1−β2 − z1−β2)














(β2 − β1)(z − z)(η + µz − σ2
z)
.
Derivation of the expression in (36):





































for all χ < −β1.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :





xβ2 − µxβ − η =0 .
Since Q(1) = σ2
x/2 − µx − η = σ2
z − η − µz < 0, Q(0) = −η < 0, limβ→∞ Q(β)=
limβ→−∞ Q(β)=∞, it follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem that β1 < 0a n d
β2 > 1.
Note that A1, A2, G1,G 2, and H1 has the same positive denominator (β2 − β1)(z −
z)
¡
η + µz − σ2
z
¢
> 0. Since β1 < 0a n dβ2 > 1, it follows that A1 < 0,A 2 < 0,G 1 < 0, and
G2 > 0.














































Since ze <z , β1 < 0a n dβ2 > 1, (z/ze)
−β1 > 1 > (ze/z)
β2 for z ∈ [z,z]. Thus, the
numerator of H1 is positive so that H1 > 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
Equity value prior to reorganization is equal to the sum of the present value of the claims
prior to reorganization and the present value of the claims after reorganization. That is,





























































into the above equation yields (43). Equation (44) follows from a similar argument.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :

























Substituting the expression for A(·) in (21) yields















I ﬁrst show that zx is increasing in b. Diﬀerentiating zx with respect to b and using the







ψ(b)+( b − b)ψ0(b)
ψ(b)(b − b)
where
ψ(b) ≡ bzd(b)−ϑ − bzd(b)−ϑ < 0.
Therefore, noting ϑ < 0, to show ∂zx
∂b > 0, one only needs to show that















Let Φ(b) be the expression on the LHS of the above inequality. It is easy to show that
Φ(b)=0a n dΦ(0) < 0. Thus, the above inequality follows from the fact that Φ0(b) > 0f o r
b ∈ [0,b).
Next, I show that equity value prior to reorganization is decreasing in b. Substituting zx
into (54) and diﬀerentiating with respective b, one can show that ∂ex(zt,z x,b,b;p)/∂b < 0.
Thus, equity value is maximized for as low coupon as possible. Since ∂zx
∂b > 0, it is optimal
to delay the debt exchange oﬀer as long as possible. But I have made the assumption that
zx ≥ zd(b;p). Thus, the constraint is binding, i.e., zx = zd(b;p).
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41T a b l e1 .B a s eC a s eP a r a m e t e rV a l u e s
Parameter Value
Returns to scale ν 0.4
Depreciation rate δ 10%
Shock drift µz 0.75%
Shock volatility σz 15%
Riskless rate r 5.22%
Corporate tax rate τ 34%
Bankruptcy cost 1 − α 20%
Poisson death η 4%
Entry cost ce 78.35
Entry distribution z 2.5
Entry distribution z 3.5
Price elasticity ε 0.75
Fixed cost cf 0
42Table 2. Comparative Statics for Selected Parameter Values.
The parameter values for the base case model are given in Table 1. Comparative statics
is based on the base case model. When performing simulations for the entry cost, I set the
ﬁxed cost cf =5 .
Industry Average Turnover Exit Optimal Tax Agency
Output Leverage Rate Threshold Coupon Advantage Cost
Base case 1 23.09 7.51 1.91 6.66 7.16 2.57
µz =1 .0% 1.03 17.50 7.29 1.92 6.62 5.46 1.80
µz =1 .5% 1.10 4.46 6.91 1.94 6.55 1.41 0.39
σz = 10% 0.97 39.43 6.04 2.04 6.28 12.55 2.76
σz = 20% 1.06 7.04 9.13 1.79 7.18 2.14 1.08
z =4 .0 1.06 22.42 7.46 2.03 6.49 6.97 2.42
z =4 .5 1.12 21.68 7.40 2.15 6.30 6.77 2.25
α = 95% 1.01 24.50 8.27 2.02 7.20 7.39 2.51
α = 90% 1.006 24.00 7.98 1.98 7.01 7.31 2.54
τ = 25% 1.04 20.43 7.12 1.84 5.96 4.63 1.74
τ = 40% 0.97 25.00 7.70 1.94 7.08 9.17 3.22
cf = 5 0.82 16.64 9.37 2.15 7.77 5.23 1.77
cf = 10 0.72 13.54 10.83 2.27 8.48 4.30 1.30
ce = 70 0.85 16.16 9.55 2.16 6.94 5.08 1.70








Figure 2: The determination of the equilibrium output price p∗.


































































Figure 3: The relation between technology growth, average industry leverage,
industry output, and the turnover rate. The technology growth µz varies over
[0.5%,1.5%]. All other parameter values are given in Table 1.

























Figure 4: The eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei ng r o w t ho ft e c h n o l o g yo nt h es c a l e dd e n s i t y
of ﬁrms. The solid line is for the base case model. The dashed line is for µz =1 .5%. All
other parameter values are given in Table 1.





























































Figure 5: The relation between technology volatility, average industry leverage,
industry output, and the turnover rate. The volatility parameter σz varies over
[5%,20%]. All other parameter values are given in Table 1.

























Figure 6: The eﬀect of an increase in risks of technology on the scaled density of
ﬁrms. The solid line is for the base case model. The dashed line is for σz = 20%. All other
parameter values are given in Table 1.































































Figure 7: The relation between bankruptcy cost, average industry leverage, in-
dustry output, and the turnover rate. The bankruptcy cost parameter 1 − α varies
over [2%,25%]. All other parameter values are given in Table 1.

























Figure 8: The eﬀect of an increase in bankruptcy cost on the scaled density of
ﬁrms. The solid line is for the base case model. The dashed line is for α = 95%. All other
parameter values are given in Table 1.































































Figure 9: The relation between the corporate tax rate, average industry lever-
age, industry output, and the turnover rate. The tax rate parameter τ varies over
[20%,50%]. All other parameter values are given in Table 1.


































































Figure 10: The relation between the ﬁxed cost, average industry leverage, indus-
try output, and the turnover rate. The ﬁxed cost parameter cf varies over [0,10]. All
other parameter values are given in Table 1.

























Figure 11: The eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eﬁx e dc o s to nt h es c a l e dd e n s i t yo f
ﬁrms. The solid line is for the base case model. The dashed line is for cf =1 0 .





























































Figure 12: The relation between the entry cost, average industry leverage, indus-
try output, and the turnover rate. The entry cost parameter ce varies over [60,100].
The ﬁxed cost is set as cf =5 . All other parameter values are given in Table 1.





























Figure 13: The eﬀect of an increase in the entry cost on the scaled density of
ﬁrms. The solid line is for ce =7 0 . The dashed line is for ce = 100. The ﬁxed cost is set
cf =5 . All other parameter values are given in Table 1.
55